Pakistan - The Caretaker

To insiders, there is a troubling unknown variable regarding the coup in Pakistan in the man who led it: General Pervious Musharraf. DP reader D N Moorty. sends us this backgrounder on the good General and current caretaker of Pakistan's bright democratic future. While described as a straight man' and a soldier of soldiers many unconfirmed reports indicate that he personally gave the green light to the Kargil military incursions of last May-July, in which Islamist radicals played a prominent role. The Pentagon has expressed satisfaction about nuclear command and control in Pakistan, that's probably because they are pointed at India not Honolulu. Nukes have always remained under the firm control of the army, even though there have been recent public discussions in Pakistani defense journals about the possibility of transferring nuclear command and control to the prime minister. The 12 October '99 coup was popular. There was widespread perception in the country that former prime minister Nawaz Sharif presided over a highly corrupt and inept government. Then again every government is considered to be highly corrupt and inept, you just can't protest the fact when the military is in charge. He had disturbed the relationship between his office, the president and the army by taking away the president's power to dismiss the prime minister. Although he used constitutional means to bring about his desired changes, his cajoling of opponents and his autocratic style had left him with a very small coterie of supporters. There were no signs of protests even in the streets of his home, Lahore, after his abrupt dismissal and arrest. Pakistan's stance on the Kashmir conflict will almost certainly harden. India has more to gain by accepting the present line of control (LoC) in Kashmir as the international border between the two countries than Pakistan. In Pakistan, such an outcome would be seen as a defeat _ not merely the kind of defeat it encountered in the aftermath of the recent skirmishes in Kargil, but a massive dent to national pride of the same proportion as the dismantlement of East Pakistan by India in 1971. This would be catastrophic for anyone in power. India's reaction to Nawaz Sharif's ousting has, in fact, been noticeably mute. India's National Security Advisory Council met to take stock of events and concluded that Musharrat was too busy for the time being to avenge the defeat in Kargil.

Nevertheless, General Malik did place the Indian Army on high alert. Again, the Bin Laden factor comes into play: not only may the Pakistan Army want to regain its lost prestige, but Osama bin Laden and his band of fundamentalists have declared a jihad against India. Given the stalemate, an early resolution of the Kashmir conflict does not seem feasible, so both India and Pakistan will continue weaponising their growing inventories of sophisticated missiles. However, since neither India nor Pakistan really wishes to seek a political solution for Kashmir, the army-led regime in Pakistan is not likely to be any more co-operative with India than the government of Nawaz Sharif. Even if there is a civilian government in Pakistan soon the resolution of this dispute is still improbable, as it requires major concessions by one or both sides, and neither side can produce them in the near future. Yet as long as it remains unresolved the dispute will continue to tick like a time bomb, except that since May 1998, when both India and Pakistan became overt nuclear powers, it is a nuclear one. Finally, like the USA, China has waited before taking any major steps related to its ties with Pakistan. General Musharraf's dealings with the radical Islamists of his own country and with the Taliban regime of Afghanistan will also serve as major litmus tests for China's next moves regarding Pakistan. China has been increasingly concerned regarding the reportedly growing contacts between the Taliban and separatist elements in its Xinjiang province. However, the heavy dependence of Pakistan on China for its military wherewithal may turn out to be one of the most potent variables in moderating the ties of the Pakistani military vis-ê-vis the domestic Islamist hardliners and the Taliban.